Codes of conduct seek to institutionalize certain practices and govern the actions of those who accept the regime. As they arise and seek to displace established ways of life in organizations, they provide examples of institutional development and change. Th is paper examines how the UK code of corporate governance arose and developed over time, and how it leads to a common understanding across various fi elds of social actors. Specifi cally, it examines the debate about what the ethos of the board for directors should be, as exhibited in consultations informing the 1992, 2003 and 2010 versions of the code. It shows social actors, as expected, taking stances aligned with their economic interests. But over time and through the institutional work involved in the debate, some of those actors identify increasingly with the process, and the collective understanding informs the identity of those participants.
Introduction
In corporate governance, and in many countries around the world, codes have become the mechanism through which boards and to some extent investors have organized their work. Companies, investors, regulators and states alike have come to the view that the internal direction-setting and control of corporations is too complex and particular to be the subject of detailed legislation or regulation. But corporate misdemeanours and malfeasance have been too prevalent and costly to leave to individual decision-making. Th e preferred solution in many places has been to turn to binding-yet-voluntary codes.
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Economics and Business Review, Vol. 3 (17) , No. 1, 2017 Codes of conduct exist within companies and industries and across countries and multilateral organizations, with increasingly widespread use (Paine, Deshpandé, Margolis, & Bettcher, 2005; Seidl, 2007) . Th ey guide the actions of individuals and organizations without the force or the infl exibility of law but also without political cost (O'Rourke, 2003) . Th ey seek followers through demonstrating the legitimacy of their recommendations, and gain legitimacy by the followers they collect. Codes have institutional characteristics, but they are not automatically institutions.
Th e aim of this paper is to explore the processes through which one such proto-institution (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) , the UK code of corporate governance, gains adherents and confers legitimacy on those who adopt it through the institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) involved in its development. Starting with the Cadbury Code in 1992 and the continuing revisions to the current UK Corporate Governance Code of 2016, corporate governance practices have become institutionalized. In so doing, it seeks to observe how institutional work in writing a code of conduct contributes to identifi cation with the code and begins to embed its values in those aff ected.
Moreover, the UK code has served as a model for code development in other countries, including France and Germany, Russia and Japan. It has also infl uenced thinking from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1999 (OECD, , 2004 , and the World Bank (IFC, 2005 (IFC, , 2007 in developing guidelines for corporations arising in transition economies of central and eastern Europe and the developing world in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004 ). However, the similarities of code around the world may be somewhat uncomfortably given the varieties for formal institutions in law and regulations, that is, the varieties of capitalism practices under diff ering institutional settings (Hall & Soskice, 2001) .
Over the past 25 years, the content of the UK's code has shown considerable continuity, despite recurring shocks. But they have seen a shift in emphasis. Th e discourse of board eff ectiveness has moved from structure in Cadbury, to independence in the 2003 version, to recognition in 2010 of the importance of behaviour, particularly in supportive yet challenging relationships between directors (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013) . In so doing, it has refl ected the tenuous links between either code-based governance structures and metrics of independence on the one hand and performance on the other (Love, 2011) . Moreover, it resonates with growing interest in the concept of behavioural governance (Marnet, 2007; van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009; Vandewaerde, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, & Bammens, 2011) .
In the formulation and evolution of the code, what processes -involving which actors, arguments and actions -allowed this code to become institutionalized and then led to this change of discourse? Th e consultations considered 75
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issues of board design and composition, tenure of directors, board evaluation processes, and the nature of enforcement and compliance, but one question linked several of the debates: What is the right ethos for the boardroom? Ethos goes to the heart of the question of behaviour.
Th is paper considers briefl y in Section 1 the literature on board eff ectiveness and then in Section 2 describes development of the fi rst code in 1992 and major revisions of 2003 and 2010 . Section 3 outlines institutional theory, institutional work, and identity work in particular. Section 4 comments on methodology, while Section 5 examines the contributions to the debate of boardroom ethos and behaviour from 1992 to 2010 to assess the actors from diff erent fi elds, their fi eld-based interests and identities, and nature of work they undertook. Section 6 discusses these fi nding in light of the complex interaction of institutional work, through which participants take on an emergent identity associated with corporate governance and the processes of codifi cation. Th e paper then concludes with a brief summary and points to unanswered questions and future research. In so doing it contributes to our understanding of the development of the UK code and codes in other countries that use it as their benchmark. It also shows how the process of identifi cation through institutional work can facilitate institutionalization in a contested fi eld.
Board eff ectiveness
A central aim of the code in all its versions is to enhance board eff ectiveness, oft en described as involving opposing functions of service and control (Aguilera, 2005; Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009) . Th e code seeks to do so through recommendations about board structure (e.g. separating the role of chairman and CEO; specifying the number of independent directors), norms (e.g. defi ning independence; prescribing fi nancial expertise on audit committees) and processes (e.g. mandating disclosure; enforcing compliance).
Codes add a structural component to the processes of board eff ectiveness identifi ed by Forbes and Milliken (1999) , with its elements of board member characteristics that interact with eff ort norms and the use of knowledge and skills and operate through cognitive confl ict. But the code recognizes, and with particular emphasis in 2010 and its deliberate change in tone (FRC, 2010 , Preface, Paragraph 6), a more elusive quality related to how directors act towards each other and with respect to shareholders. Th is emphasis refl ects the need for cohesiveness in a board, which Forbes and Milliken (1999) see in a tense relationship with cognitive confl ict. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005, p. S6 ) endorse a similar need in suggesting outside directors be "engaged but non-executive", "challenging but supportive" and "independent but involved".
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Code development
Th e three main versions of the code arose in similar circumstances: Corporate failures provided a precipitating jolt (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) that placed the legitimacy of current arrangements in doubt. While the jolts had similarities, the processes of codifi cation diff ered in detail.
Process in 1991-92
Th e Cadbury Code emerged aft er 18 months of discussion and debate. Th e Financial Reporting Council and the London Stock Exchange asked Sir Adrian Cadbury, scion of a Quaker family of industrialists, to lead an inquiry starting in May 1991. Both organizations were, at the time, industry self-regulatory bodies overseeing the accounting and audit professions (FRC) and the equity markets (LSE and its UK Listing Authority); the initiative was largely a private-sector aff air.
Although a private-sector initiative, the work had public backing. With support of staff seconded by the Bank of England and the Department of Trade and Industry, Sir Adrian empanelled a committee drawn from industry, the fi nancial community and the accounting profession. Th ey interviewed dozens of people, received contributions by post and fax, and attended public meetings. In May 1992 the committee produced a draft code and discussion paper and then undertook a formal consultation before publishing the code in December 1992. Many of the documents from that inquiry are digitized and available online (Cadbury Archive, 2010) and are drawn from more than 200 from before the draft text was issued in May 1992 and almost as many in response to the July draft .
Process in 2002-03
Government took the lead in response to the crisis at Enron and other companies in the opening years of the 2000s. It commissioned three studies on corporate governance: Th e Higgs Review (2003) on the eff ectiveness of nonexecutive directors, the Smith Review (2003) on audit, and the Tyson Report (2003) on widening the pool of directors. Th e centrality of Higgs to the revision of the Combined Code that July means we focus here on responses to it.
Higgs commissioned three research studies: a statistical analysis of board composition; a survey profi ling more than 600 directors (MORI, 2002) ; and research involving in-depth interviews with 40 corporate chairmen and directors (McNulty, Roberts, & Stiles, 2003) . Th e review proved controversial. Th e FRC chairman later recalled the "media noise level and the hostility… by company Chairmen" (Nicholson, 2008, p. 110) . What the FRC, now a governmentdirected agency, had intended as a quick, "fatal fl aws only" review received more than 180 responses (FRC, 2004) . In addition, public and private gatherings discussed the implications for companies, and institutional shareholders. 
Process in 2009-10
Despite the Higgs controversy, recommended practices were widely adopted and further revisions in 2006 and 2008 made only modest changes. But the fi nancial crisis led to the collapse of one UK bank in 2007; the near-global meltdown forced part-nationalization of two more large British banks in 2008. Th e consequences were two-fold: First, the government commissioned an inquiry into the corporate governance at fi nancial institutions (Walker, 2009a (Walker, , 2009b Th e FRC received more than 100 written submissions to each consultation. Some individuals and groups felt that corporate governance had taken a wrong turn -in one direction or another -and wanted to steer the code towards a different goal. For others, the code had become symbolic of what they valued in corporate governance, something to be defended against those who would dilute its aims or tighten its constraints.
Contributions to consultations shared a purpose: development of a common understanding of good corporate governance. Many participants had another aim: the avoidance of legislative or regulatory action to constrain boards. Th e crisis that led to the Cadbury Report probably meant the change was inevitable. New institutional arrangements would supplant undefi ned arrangements copied informally between boards, that is, mimetic isomorphism gives way to the normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . Some participants wanted to go further, enacting binding rules and coercing compliance. Th ese voices, as well as the actions of the authors of the code version, may be viewed as engaging in institutional work.
Institutions, work and identity
Institutions persist over time, and yet they change. Th is paradox of embedded agency (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002) has stimulated much work in institutional theory as it seeks to overcome objections that it is only a partial theory (Clegg, 2010; Kraatz, 2011) . In seeking to understand how this paradox is resolved, theorists have turned to a variety of explanations.
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Economics and Business Review, Vol. 3 (17) , No. 1, 2017 3.1. Institutional work DiMaggio (1988) introduced the term institutional entrepreneurship to explain how actors use ideas from outside to dislodge incumbent practices and create opportunities for change. Oliver (1992, p. 564) argues that deinstitutionalization represents "the de-legitimation of an established organizational practice or procedure" in response to challenges facing the organization or the failure of organizations to perform as expected. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) see dissatisfaction with a changing market context and discrepancies between the values of actors and institutional arrangements as antecedents of institutional change. But what starts the process? Greenwood and colleagues (2002) theorize that a precipitating jolt from changes in the environment would make embedded actors perceive the inadequacy of current arrangements.
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) see institutional change as coming from elites who recognize the contradictions in the institutional fi eld and initiate change. But Rao and Giorgi (2006) contend that actors on the periphery of a social system can eff ect change as well. Th ese depictions suggest that change arises from the choices initiated by actors but largely in response to environmental issues that undermine the institution's legitimacy.
Extending the entrepreneurship concept, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 215) introduce the term institutional work to encompass "purposive action of individuals or organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions". Work is intentional, not simply routinized behaviour, the eff ort of agency rather than the product of structure. Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2011, p. 56) argue that concept of institutional work provides a "bridge" between critical and institutional views of organizations by focusing on actors, their intentions and hidden voices.
Institutional work depends on agency, which may vary over time. Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 1012) assert that actors "are always living simultaneously in the past, future, and present". Th ey identify three types of agency: a backward-oriented approach they call iterative; the present-oriented, practicalevaluative type; and a forward-looking form they call projective. Battilana and D' Aunno (2009) use these categories to elaborate institutional work, setting them against categories of actions in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) involved in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. Iterative agency involves repeated steps to emphasize persistence; the practical-evaluative type demonstrates the (in)effi cacy of the logics they support or wish to disrupt; projective agency involves imagining a diff erent future state. Th e 20 types of institutional work they articulate overlap with the 18 in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) . It also off ers some new forms of work, including two they see as work involved in creating institutions in present-oriented, practical-evaluative agency. Actors interpret institutional arrangements (translation) or assemble elements from diff erent mechanisms (bricolage) to fi t particular settings. As we shall see, both 79
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have resonances in the way individual companies respond to corporate governance arrangements under a comply-or-explain regime involving internationally active actors. Moreover, translation suggests that ideas oft en do not diff use intact through a fi eld but instead are interpreted as they pass from one actor to another (Czarniawska, 2007; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) .
Identity work in institutional theory
Institutional work can take the form of individuals identifying with the institution or with alternative arrangements. Creed, Dejordy, and Lok (2010 Lok ( , p. 1337 describe the "identity work" of marginalized actors through a process that can be both "conservative and disruptive". Th is depiction suggests that institutional work need not sit fi rmly within the categories of "creating", "maintaining" or "disrupting" identifi ed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) . In a study related to the present paper, Lok (2010) found that both investors and corporate managers invoked confl icting logics, diff ering identities and contrasting associated practices in their approach to corporate governance, and suggested that these contradictions can persist over long periods. He notes that "self-identity can continue to be fractured and inconsistent, invoking diff erent contradictory practices under diff erent circumstances and at diff erent times" (Lok, 2010 (Lok, , p. 1326 . Th e intentionality of institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) combined with considerations of identity suggest the nature of institutional work may be dependent on the interpretation actors give to aspects of the institution and its logic. With this background in mind we look at what institutional work happened during the consultations about UK corporate governance, following a description of the methodology used.
Bévort and Suddaby (2016) see identity work in the way accountants coped with shift ing institutional logics as fi rms grew more managerial and a profi tcorporate logic clashed with the professional, client-oriented one that had long informed accountancy training and practice. Unlike many previous studies of identity and institutional work, theirs focuses on the processes of identifi cation of individuals, rather than organizations. Th e study urges scholars to pay closer attention to individuals as social actors in seeking to establish the processes of institutionalization and institutional change. Th e present study seeks to do that by attending to both organizational and personal contributions to the debate over the nature of corporate boards.
Methodology
To examine institutional work and identifi cation, this paper uses evidence from the consultations that led to the creation of the UK corporate governance code in 1992, following a series of corporate governance failures. It then examines those ongoing consultations for the major modifi cations undertaken as fresh crises in corporate governance struck, in the early 2000s and then in response to the fi nancial crisis later in that decade.
Analysis involved an iterative reading of submissions to the debates concerning the three code versions, paying close attention to language and argument. Discourse analysis developed from a more general study of themes that arise from texts into specialized disciplines using techniques drawn from fi elds as disparate as linguistics, literary theory, critical theory in politics and sociology and psychology (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Chia, 2000) . While some studies explore these approaches in isolation to determine their methodological signifi cance, this paper seeks to interpret texts. It requires, therefore, that we look at various aspects of language, including diction, word order, metaphor, stated and unstated allusions, as well as the use of forceful rhetoric to identify meanings and assumptions.
Th e documents necessarily present an incomplete view, but they provide opportunity to explore the arguments and rhetoric of offi cials of listed companies, fi nancial institutions, their advisers and the general public. Formal responses may lack the spontaneity and vibrant language of face-to-face communications. Nonetheless, the submissions represent a considered distillation of views, ones that a committee or a thoughtful author would give weight to in setting policy. Th ere is evidence of this in the data, in particular in the summaries in the Cadbury Archive, which interpret those submissions to guide committee members' thinking.
Work began by reading a large proportion of the available documents. Because of the volume of the data, detailed analysis was undertaken on a sample of papers and a subset of the issues. Th is study used theoretical sampling based on two criteria: First, following Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) and Rao and Giorgi (2006) , was the position of actors in the fi eld, in this case the investment supply chain. Second, was the salience of issues (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) , which led to consideration of topics based on the controversy they aroused.
Th e documents were coded in Nvivo soft ware into categories including concepts such as chairman, institutional investors, and then higher level ones such as compliance, structure, independence and behaviour. As new ideas came to the fore, additional coding was applied for emerging categories, and then the papers were read again to identify axial dimensions (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) , in this case drawing on the literature of board eff ectiveness. Of relevance to the analysis below, axial coding refl ected the apparent tension in the data between industry expertise and independence and its eff ect on boardroom challenge and cohesiveness. Th e texts were then read against categories of institutional work developed from perspectives in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) and Battilana and D' Aunno (2009) . Th e data-coding presented numerous opportunities to read and re-read the source material, in its entirety and as coded.
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Although the initial reading for this study ranged widely in the documentation, analysis concentrated on contributions made during public consultations: 1) aft er the Cadbury Committee had issued its draft in July 1992 and before the fi nal code in December; 2) aft er publication of the Higgs Review in January 2003 and before the July publication of the Combined Code; and 3) all three consultation phases concerning the 2010 code.
Findings
Th e three versions of the code show concern about issues aff ecting mainly structure, independence and behaviour, with a changing emphasis over time (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013) . Th e consultations gathered views from a wide spectrum of actors. At the centre of the corporate governance debate were senior corporate offi cers, and representatives of investment fi rms and trade associations. At one step removed were professional advisors and importantly the accountancy profession. More peripheral actors came from public interest organizations, political actors, and those focused on non-shareholder interests. But contributors from across the spectrum viewed these themes as interlocking: For example, structures such as board committees empower non-executive directors at the expense of executives, thus contributing to board independence and potentially infl uencing behaviour.
Th e three rounds of consultations considered issues including the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO (1992 only; participants took that for granted during subsequent revisions); creating a senior independent director (1992), giving that person a specifi c duties with investors (2003), and then suggesting diff erent behavioural expectations of the role (2010); the creation of committees (1992), which were then placed under the control of independent directors (2003); limiting the tenure of non-executives' deemed independence (2003 and 2010) ; frequency of director elections (all three versions); giving non-executives the right to hire external professional advice (1992 only). In both 2003 and 2010 controversy arose about whether, when and how to conduct board evaluation. Arguments on one side over structure or procedure focused on how to strengthen board independence to induce challenge, expanding the board's ability to exercise its "control" function. Th e arguments on the other focused on how these measures would prove divisive, pitting directors against each other and splitting the board between executive and non-executive members.
Contributors in each time period evoked a theme concerning the nature of accountability. On one side we hear voices emphasizing the need for boardroom challenge, which would constrain managerial discretion; on the otherand particularly though not exclusively from corporate actors -come those seeking collegiality and contributions to strategy. Taken together they concern the ethos of the boardroom.
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Boardroom ethos
How directors behave -that is, behaviour within boards and between boards and shareholders -has been an important concern of the code since its inception, but one where the codes' authors have accepted that a code could have little direct impact. As a result, the code has sought to deal with behavioural issues by proxy. Structures and procedures seek to limit the discretion of the board and, thus, the range of possible behaviour. Independence of mind aims to encourage constructive boardroom challenge; lacking a mechanism to ensure it, the code settles for defi nitions of independence. Some provisions, including controversial ones like board evaluation, may prescribe activities of the board in the hope they will lead to changes in behaviour. With the fi nancial crisis of 2007-09, however, came stronger acknowledgement that these proxy approaches were insuffi cient.
Board ethos in the Cadbury debate. Documents in the Cadbury Archive show the committee's concern that the code might miss the target. A hint comes from the chairman's document (CAD-01265; NB: references with the prefi x CAD-refer to the document number in the Cadbury Archive at the University of Cambridge) prepared for the committee as it reviewed all the responses to its May 1992 draft report in September, when the committee would agree the thrust and some detail for fi nal report. A note in an appendix called " Table of Points for Discussion" includes item 12 on "Th e Board", where the note-writer, in what appears to be Sir Adrian's handwriting, writes: "More emphasis on behaviour needed, less on structure?" Th at question does not appear in any document off ered for the committee's deliberations, but several of the changes agreed that day came in response to concerns about excessive prescription and the "tone" of the draft report, matters that link structure and behaviour. Th is debate suggests recognition by the committee of the tension between structure and agency in achieving board eff ectiveness. In his submission to the committee, Richard Lloyd, the Vickers chairman, put it this way:
[…] your Report perhaps should pay more heed in your fi nal version to certain behavioural aspects which are, in our view, central to a Board's eff ectiveness […] most U.K. Boards, anyway those of medium-size companies, are probably more intimately involved in the knowledge, understanding and direction of the business than is the case with counterparts across the Atlantic (CAD-01357).
Th ese "behavioural aspects" echo the need for the "presence" and "use" of knowledge and skills in the Forbes and Milliken (1999) model of board eff ectiveness. Lloyd links them to the "genuinely unitary" nature of UK boards, as opposed to the more supervisory approach in the US. Paul Girolami, Glaxo's chairman, worried that the draft cast non-executives as "watchdogs or guardians" of interests of shareholder interests or even those of "the public": 83
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We do not see this as the only -or even primary -role of the non-executive directors. Th ey bring to the boardroom independence and outside experience which cannot be provided by the executive directors, and those qualities are (or ought to be) deployed to enhance the general decision-making of the Board on all the aspects of corporate aff airs with which it has to deal. Th e constructive harnessing of this spectrum of experience requires the creation of a team ethos (CAD-02105).
Th e equine metaphor of "constructive harnessing", coupled with the electromagnetic and colourful metaphor in "spectrum", invokes images the sense of abundant and unruly force channelled to good purpose. Th e use of "team ethos" is valorized as a "creation". Th e self-described "professional chairman" J.B.H. Jackson put "a lot of eff ort into keeping boards united and am nervous of external interventions which could run against this"; he was "particularly nervous of cultivating the notion that the standards of behaviour anticipated by 'the City' diff er between executive and non-executive directors" (CAD-02143). Here "the City" -the fi nanciers in the City of London -is a distant, alien force seeking to divide those "united" on the board.
Stanley Kalms, chairman of Dixons, wrote about the "unique cultures" of companies as justifying the assertion that there was "little benefi t in absolute uniformity for its own sake" and warning against a code that "did not recognise individuality" (CAD-02167). Sir Richard Greenbury, chairman of Marks & Spencer, said companies "must act as a cohesive unit"; the context makes clear this refers in particular to boards. Moreover, "whatever Code or Regulation may be in place, the issue [of boardroom power] will be decided by the mix of personalities" (CAD-02343).
Th ese comments emphasize simultaneously the singularity of companies and the unity boards. Th ey perceive a threat in a one-size-fi ts-all code; the individuality of personalities within the boardroom contributes to the unity of the unitary board. Th e purpose that this unity-in-individuality served was expressed by the Confederation of British Industry in arguing that the draft […] understates the contribution which the non-executives can make to the growth of a business: their diff erent experience brings a fresh eye to problems and the development of strategy (CAD-02349).
Non-executives contribute scarce resources ("experience", "a fresh eye") for the sake of developing strategy and promoting growth. Th ese views paint a picture in which the board is an exciting place to be, a place where structures enable more than they constrain, a place alive with contradictions and uncertainties, and a place the draft code threatened to disrupt. roles for executives and non-executives but put emphasis not on the control function of non-executives but their service: "balance is provided between executive responsibility for day to day management and non-executive strategic input" (CAD-02353). Th e investment company 3i went further, noting that it was worried that the draft wanted non-executives to act as "corporate policeman" when they were needed to contribute to policy development. It installed directors on the companies in which it invested "to benefi t the business not to police our investment" (CAD-02387). It is worth noting that L&G and 3i were themselves major listed companies as well as important investors.
Board ethos in the post-Higgs debate. Th e Higgs Review of the eff ectiveness of non-executive directors sought to emphasize the importance of behaviour for the eff ectiveness of boards. In the body of his report, Higgs added: "Th e key to non-executive director eff ectiveness lies as much in behaviours and relationships as in structures and processes" (2003, Paragraph 6.3), before outlining the "behaviours and personal attributes" of non-executives (Paragraphs 6.9-6.19). He also provided guidance on the behaviour of eff ective chairmen in an annex. He used "behaviour" and "behaviours" almost interchangeably, leaving readers to interpret to what extent they mean the general depiction of the interaction of directors or observable phenomena. Respondents, particularly but not exclusively from corporations, worried that proposed prescriptions would require specifi c behaviours, leading to divisions within a unitary board and harming performance, rather than fostering trust. We look next at a specifi c case of their impact: the role of the senior independent director, or SID, and how it would divide the board. Higgs recommended that the SID have a direct relationship with investors. Other non-executive directors meet investors, too, but they should "rely on the chairman and the senior independent director to ensure a balanced view is taken" (Higgs, 2003, Paragraph 15.16) . Th e SID, by contrast, "should attend sufficient of the regular meetings of management with a range of major shareholders to develop a balanced understanding of the themes, issues and concerns of shareholders" (2003, Paragraph 15.15) . Moreover, Higgs proposed the SID be available to shareholders "if they have reason for concern that contact through the normal channels of chairman or chief executive has failed to resolve" (2003, Paragraph 7.5). To many respondents, and especially company chairmen, this challenged the authority of the chairman. Th e CBI responded in these terms:
Business is concerned that the proposed Code inadvertently undermines the role of the chairman of a company. It is in no one's interests that this happens (CBI, 16 April 2003, Paragraph 10).
We are also very concerned about the proposed role of the senior independent director. Business believes that this could inadvertently create three separate forces in a board whereas boards need to be a united force. Th e Cadbury Report iden-85
tifi ed the danger of a CEO dominating the board. What the Report says on the senior independent director actually does increase the potential risk of a CEO playing off the senior independent against the chairman and thereby weakening the chairman. Th is very much undermines the Cadbury philosophy (CBI, 16 April 2003, Paragraph 12).
Here the trade association seeks to assert authority by identifying its view with that of "Business", claiming through a totum pro parte authority beyond the scope of its (already powerful) membership. Th at the "undermining" is "inadvertent" seeks to prevent damage without provoking retaliation. By suggesting Higgs might undermine the aims of Cadbury and thus strengthen the hand of the chief executive, the CBI attacks Higgs by invoking the very logic of his review.
Baroness Hogg, chairman of the listed private equity group 3i and one of the very few women respondents, said Higgs did "not suffi ciently distinguish between the 'backstop' role of the Senior Independent Director, and the dayto-day responsibilities of the Chairman" (2 April 2003). Th is is language that defends ("backstop") and thus maintains the status quo and her own role, while seeking to disrupt the changes Higgs planned. Lord Weir, chairman of the construction group Balfour Beatty, argued that the "promotion" of the SID would "undermine the role of the Chairman". His company had not seen the need to follow Cadbury's guidance on designated a senior non-executive in view of the independence of the chairman. Martin Broughton, chairman of BAT, said investors "rarely avail themselves" of the existing opportunity for contact with other directors. Moreover, he called another of the Higgs recommendationsthat the chairman not chair the nominations committee or even sit on the audit and remuneration committees -"constitutionally unsound".
Th ese and other expressions of concern from the corporate side might be seen as chairmen protecting their own positions. But their reasoning invokes corporate benefi t arising from trust and collegial behaviour. Moreover, similar sentiments appear in submissions from mainstream investors and their representatives, though in less forceful language. It was a shared issue, if perhaps with diff erent salience to these two core groups.
Board ethos in the post-fi nancial crisis debate. As the debate got underway in 2009, the Association of British Insurers called attention to relatively new terminology in the fi eld: behavioural governance. Th e ABI's fi rst submission urged the code-writers to recognize that how people relate is more important than compliance. It did so by drawing a distinction between substance and form:
In our view the Code, which represents form, can only be eff ective if the subjects (in most cases the non-executives) apply its principles properly, thereby creating the substance. Th is application may be termed behavioural governance. Behavioural governance will be aff ected by such attributes as skills and experience of the in-
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Economics and Business Review, Vol. 3 (17) , No. 1, 2017 dividuals, but the two most important attributes a non-executive must have is personal integrity and good judgement. Th e ABI recognises that it is highly diffi cult to demonstrate such attributes through a Code, we therefore believe that the most eff ective way to assess this is through interaction and dialogue between non-executives and investors (ABI, May 2009, pp. 2-3) .
Th e value descriptors here are "integrity" and "judgement" not compliance. Th e mechanisms are "interaction" and "dialogue", though crucially these terms refer to the relationship between directors and investors, placing emphasis on hierarchical accountability rather than mutuality and trust in the boardroom. It acknowledges shareholder primacy while also seeking to move directors' actions away from narrow compliance.
Th e ABI's submission returned to the theme two pages later when discussing risk management:
Th e ability to understand the risks includes an element of judgement. Th is therefore is an aspect of behavioural governance that investors, as outsiders, will always to a degree struggle to fully grasp. One method of addressing this is to look to "expert" directors to provide comfort. However, whilst we support the concept of a fi nancial expert on an Audit Committee and relevant expertise being present on the board, we would counsel against over reliance on "experts". It is our experience that whilst experts are useful they also have a tendency to be more easily "captured" as they will naturally see things in a similar manner to other experts, usually management. As important as expert knowledge is, it must be coupled with keen skills of critical analysis, the ability to constructively challenge and question assumptions. Also, other directors may tend to rely too much on the views of the 'expert' rather than bringing their own judgement to bear (ABI, May 2009, p. 5, punctuation inconsistencies in the original).
Th e section is worth quoting at length because, unlike other submissions from central actors or its own submissions on other points, the ABI here elaborated its argument, rather than relying upon assumed meanings. Much of the debate preceding the consultation concerned how independent non-executives on bank boards had failed to understand risk. One solution, suggested in the Walker Review two months later, was greater expertise. But here the ABI, a trade association for risk experts, argued against expertise, and in rather forceful terms. Experts were "more easily 'captured'", so other directors must bring "judgement to bear". Th e experts themselves must be more than expert; they must also have "keen skills of critical analysis", and then "constructively challenge" and "question assumptions". Th is argument maintains the institution of the code with its emphasis on independence even as it seeks to push it along the path of relying more on behaviour. Th at the language here is much more vivid than in much of the rest of its submission suggests that its author(s) saw this as a crucial issue. Th e institutional work is moving in two directions, disrupting the code's reliance on structure and independence while maintaining them as well.
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Other submissions also placed emphasis on behaviour more than compliance. Th e CBI's fi rst submission spoke of the importance of the more general importance of having a "culture of challenge" in the boardroom, arising from having a "broad talent pool" of non-executive directors, before adding:
Th e eff ective application of the Code's principles is largely reliant on the behaviour [sic] of individuals and their interactions. Th is is not something that can sensibly be legislated for or regulated (CBI, May 2009, p. 2) .
In contrast to the ABI submission, this account of behaviour and these interactions are internal to the board, not also in relation to shareholders. Moreover, neither the code-writers nor government can "sensibly" contribute much to improve it. Th e CBI's language affi rms the code's value while undermining readings of it the emphasize structure. It denigrates legislation and regulation, implicitly also denigrating the more regulatory approaches to the code implicit in the compliance mentality other contributors, particularly peripheral actors, had stressed.
Th e submission from GC100, an association of corporate counsel from the largest companies, made a similar point in suggesting a non-regulatory approach:
Th e Code will only provide a framework for good governance but will not alleviate the issues caused by bad management within a company. Th ese behavioural issues can certainly be infl uenced through a robust board/committee evaluation process and possibly through guidance on best practice from the FRC (GC100, May 2009, p. 4).
Th is view affi rms the value of the code even as it challenges it: the code is "only" a framework, though the committees it has legitimatized can infl uence behaviour through "robust" process of evaluation, thus affi rming while simultaneously questioning the eff ectiveness of code. SABMiller identifi ed with the CG100 stance in its submission, before adding:
If there were governance weaknesses that contributed to the current crisis, it was in the application of the Code rather than a lack of prescription within the Code itself. Adding extra governance requirements is likely to lead to more box ticking and hamper eff ective scrutiny by non executive directors by occupying time with form rather than looking at substance. Key to the eff ectiveness of corporate governance is the calibre of the individuals involved, and that they have a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities and the tools necessary to discharge their responsibilities eff ectively (SABMiller, May 2009, p. 1) .
Th e contrast between "form" and "substance" returns, as do the limitations of codes in dealing with behaviour. Articulation of code creates "more box ticking", one of many uses of the derogatory phrase made in submissions from actors in central positions. Emphasis is placed instead on the "calibre of the individuals" with the "necessary" tools. Th at could be read as a request for more 88 Economics and Business Review, Vol. 3 (17) , No. 1, 2017 tools, had not the passage already warned that extra requirements would "hamper eff ective scrutiny" and thus be counterproductive. Th is is language aimed at maintaining the code, and the logic of corporate governance as SABMiller interprets it, but also to disrupt the plans of others to assert their interpretation of codes as defi ning acceptable behaviour, not merely providing structures within which agents can act.
As the three consultations progressed, the topic returns from a large number of actors. Th e CBI's October 2009 submission suggested: "Promoting a culture of respect, trust and challenge is the most important issue, and ultimately the job of the chairman. Th e CBI believes that there is only so far you can codify all of this" (p. 3). A few pages later in discussing board evaluation, it added:
Th e key aspect of board performance is behavioural, and therefore much less amenable to formal "testing". External evaluation should not be a substitute for open debate and robust challenge between the Executive and the NEDs, nor eff ective communication and engagement with shareholders (CBI, October 2009, p. 6) .
Not all respondents agreed. Th e second submission by Fair Pensions, an advisory fi rm to pension funds, responded to the FRC assertion that "Th ere is a recognition that the quality of corporate governance ultimately depends on behaviour not process" in the following terms:
Everyone accepts that good governance depends on behaviour and that regulation alone is not enough. Th e practical question, however, is what form of regulation will best promote the required behaviour (Fair Pensions, October 2009, p. 2) .
Th e word "however" emphasises the rhetorical change of direction and one that invokes a diff erent, regulatory logic of behaviour more akin to agency than stewardship theory in corporate governance, emphasizing more the structure in an institutional approach to the fi eld than the concept of embedded agency. Th is form of institutional work is both maintaining the code and disrupting attempts of those in more central positions to maintain their understandings of the code.
Voices present but missing from this debate. As an advisory fi rm on ethical investments, Fair Pensions sits some distance from the centre of the investment fi eld. Th eirs were among the few documents from more peripheral actors to make any signifi cant statements about behaviour, and its contribution emphasizes the primacy of control through regulation, not cohesiveness, collegiality and trust. Other non-core actors -whether close intermediates like accountancy fi rms or lawyers, or more distant ones like academics or proxy voting agenciesalso focused on structure and independence, that is, on achieving greater control, not the contribution of enhanced service. Perhaps they were too removed from what goes on inside the "black box" of the boardroom (Huse, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) to feel competent to judge how codes might aff ect behaviour.
Discussion
Th is paper provides several insights concerning corporate governance, the nature of institutional work, and the process of identifi cation. With the exceptions of corporate responses the contributions to the debates were largely made by organizations. But occasionally named individuals fi led the statements, and among the organizational submissions, the corporate governance specialists at many companies were individuals well known in the fi eld with strong reputations they developed in part through their continuing involvement in the process of codifi cation.
Institutional work in corporate governance
Writing the code was in general a conservative process throughout the period. Despite crises of legitimacy, these eff orts arose largely outside political and legislative purview. As a consequence, the actors engaged in them were largely those with vested interests in incumbent practices as much as future outcomes. Th ose conditions suggest processes where little institutional change would emerge and the work done would be mainly of the "maintaining" varieties in Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) .
Work in 1992.
Cadbury's work was institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988) , seizing an opportunity when the legitimacy of established practices had come into question. Th e process, including the consultations and the informal meetings, research and media coverage that surrounded it, provided repeated opportunities for the work which Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) call educating, theorizing, defi ning and vesting. Th e consultation worked by constructing normative networks among contributors and between them and the draft ing committees and individuals. Th e initial work changed normative associations by connecting intended practices with moral underpinnings, which were reinforced by the association of the Cadbury family over generations with practices we now call social responsibility. Cadbury was the moral face of capitalism; Maxwell was the opposite.
Enlisting important industrialists for the committee and soliciting views from others brought potential opponents into a position where they needed to articulate their position from within the frame set by Cadbury's draft had set. In contributing to the debate, opponents construct identities not too far removed from the terms the draft had given; its new mechanisms then facilitate diff usion of the new practices, or at least their translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) by actors less than thoroughly convinced by the arguments they have heard. Th is echoes the projective agency in the version of institutional work in Battilana and D' Aunno (2009) . But holding open competing views through the comply-or-explain regime, the code that emerged allows actors in the fi eld to 90 Economics and Business Review, Vol. 3 (17) , No. 1, 2017 keep multiple identities following diff erent logics in a kind of suspended animation as they incorporate the code in their own practice. Th is identity work (Creed et al., 2010; Lok, 2010) suggests a need to add another type of practical-evaluation agency to Battilana and D' Aunno's phase of creating institutions.
Work in later versions. Subsequent major versions paint a more complex picture. With a formal code in place, the canvas that Higgs and then the FRC used in 2003 was not blank. Existing practices from Cadbury had been institutionalized over a decade and mythologized, a form of "maintaining" work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) . Th rough the iconic status of the code around the world, those practices had won over critics from 1992. Contributions to the "fatal fl aws only" review in 2003 suggest that many had come to identify with Cadbury precepts, including ones they had viewed as radical in 1992. Th at is, these organizations and in some cases individuals had learned to adapt through translation and bricolage to use the code and still suit their companies' circumstances.
Th ey praised the Higgs Review (2003) and its insights into non-executive directors, a form of "valorizing", but disputed its recommendations, "demonizing" as alien in their attempt to split the board. Th is is work by these actors that Lawrence and Suddaby would call "maintaining" incumbent arrangements but it is also disrupting the entrepreneurship in Higgs. Nicholson faced that fury with a fudge. He converted Higgs's recommendation of a defi nition of independence involving a six-year tenure into what came to be called the "nineyear rule" created in the 2003 Combined Code. Th at was work that Battilana and D' Aunno (2009) would call "repairing" or a change Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) would see as "enabling" -both of the "maintaining" variety -but maintaining entrepreneurial ideas, while disrupting existing arrangements.
In 2010, Sir Christopher Hogg's changes to the code recognized issues left untreated in the Cadbury and Higgs inquiries, that the boardroom ethos was more important than structures or formal defi nitions of independence. Contributions to that consultation nonetheless brought up old ideas and issues up for reconsideration, ideas that sought again to address questions of structure and defi nitions of independence. Th e institutional work was a repeat of prior attempts by some to repair and others to undermine the moral associations of a code that had failed to prevent a recurrent wave of governance failings. What emerged, however, was advocacy of translation and bricolage, advocacy of deinstitutionalization through explanations rather than compliance. Th e 2010 code picked up and amplifi ed the subtext of the discourse that spoke of the limitations of code and the need for a combination of trust and challenge, respect within critique, that corporate actors and some others had advocated since the earliest days, but which previous authors of the code had refl ected only in part. Was this work disrupting existing arrangements, maintaining the spirit by repairing the language, or creating something rather diff erent?
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Actors from diff erent parts of the broader fi eld of corporate governance would view these examples of work diff erently. Th ose that start with a logic of control as the purpose of boards could fi nd the advocacy from corporations and the actions of the author in the 2010 process as disrupting to the central purpose corporate governance. Th ose that start from a logic of service, of the board as a solution to resource constraints, could see in the 2010 process invention and advocacy of a new set of arrangements that simultaneously undermined incumbent ones.
Work as contingent on position in the fi eld. Th is discussion suggests that the concept of institutional work is contingent on the position of the actors in the broader fi eld: work one actor might view as maintaining an institution is one that disrupts the diff usion of arrangements that others advocate, a somewhat diff erent view from that developed by Creed and colleagues (2010) . In their case, marginal actors committed to the institutions acted as change agents, thus simultaneously maintaining and disrupting it. Here, actors hold diff ering interpretations of the key tenets of institution -what constitutes board eff ectiveness -and its logic -control or service -each supported by texts and discourses that permit adherents to hold them in contradiction. Th is is true particularly for this case, because the fi eld is unsettled.
Codifi cation and identity
Th is paper demonstrates the processes of institutional work creating the code and then helping it to evolve it over time. Th e initial hostility to provisions in Cadbury seen as disrupting the ethos of UK boards was diminished and in some cases no longer present later on. Th at is, the institutionalization of the code has taken hold as individuals and organizational actors adapted their practices, and found ways to sustain the elements of ethos of boards. When the subsequent revision aft er the Higgs Review challenged their understandings of board ethos, those voices argued for Cadbury but against its extension into a more confrontational board, but then lost the argument. By 2010, however, the process of codifi cation reopens the debate about ethos and, without rolling back the provisions installed through Higgs, urges greater use of explanation rather than compliance, acknowledging the fears that corporate governance had become oppressive to the way boards work.
Th rough the process of codifi cation, that is through the institutional work of creating, maintaining and occasionally seeking to disrupt the code, contributors' views moderate. Actors from the investment side voice ideas identifi ed with corporate economic interests. Similarly, corporate actors come to voice sentiments that acknowledge investor interests. Some non-core actors' views also converge, as they identify through the processes of codifi cation and institutional work with an emerging logic of corporate governance itself. Th is refl ects what individuals active in the UK corporate governance fi eld have remarked anecdotally that individuals identify as corporate governance specialists, sometimes more strongly than with the organization and fi eld (corporations, investor, advisor, agitator) in which they work.
Conclusions
Th ere are several unanswered questions, two of which warrant brief attention here. First are the absent voices. Th e consistency of the respondents masks changes that have taken place during the fi rst two decades of the code's existence. Th e 2010 consultation process went largely without comment from hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds and other foreign investors, suggesting that its legitimacy may over time come into question. Second, the respondents are individuals, oft en writing in a corporate persona. If the fi nding of this study is that actors show greater allegiance to the principles of the code than one might expect from their organizations, the legitimacy may erode as individuals depart from the scene or structural changes occur in the investment supply chain. Perhaps corporate governance has a biography, as well as a history.
Th e discussion on boardroom ethos has roots in the experience of individuals, and not just corporate actors, responding to the issues the consultations raised. As we have seen, respondents came from a variety of parts of the investment supply chain, bringing with them both a range of views roughly corresponding to their economic interests and a large degree of shared values about the nature of corporate governance and the importance of fi nding better ways of making it work. Th e contributions suggest that corporate governance means more to the individuals than their narrow self-interest of their organizations would dictate. In that sense they have developed identities that embrace the broader fi eld of corporate governance, not just the organizational fi eld in which they sit.
Th e study also leads us to think anew about the processes of institutionalization. Th e early puzzle that confronted institutional scholars was to explain why organizations were so oft en the same, and why that sameness persisted despite evolving market conditions and product and process innovation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . Th e eff ort to institutionalize the work of boards of directors, to reach a consensus of how directors should interact and what ethos boardrooms should thus have, is to deny the individuality of fi rms and their strategic imperative to be diff erent from each other.
It may be that boards are already abstracted from the day-to-day business of managing fi rm-specifi c resources and activities. If so then codifying their practices could be an appropriate general principle, and one that might apply despite the varying formal institutions of law and regulations that the varieties of capitalism approach depicts (Hall & Soskice, 2001) . If so, then codes might need to be more, not less fl exible if they are to function under varying types of organizations and types of market conditions, as well as varying formal institutional arrangements. Th at seems to be what the comply-or-explain provision of the UK code is trying to do. Th is seems to argue for the notion of greater board discretion that is observed in the attempts by practitioners to shape the recommendations of what the code says about how directors interact even as those actors identify with governance as a vocation and reach a growing consensus about the nature of the task.
